The Roman army in the Augustan era

When Octavian emerged from the civil wars as the sole victor, there was no denying that he had won by feats of arms. Octavian was essentially nothing more than a warlord, unless he could get the support from the upper classes and senate to legitimize his position. He accordingly chose to emphasize just about any aspect of his status apart from the army. Nevertheless, he did have to do something about it. After the battle of Actium, the future Augustus was in command of some 60 legions (at a theoretical strength of some 300,000 troops), hundreds of warships and an unknown number of auxiliary troops. Many of the soldiers had been under arms for a decade and some had even lived through Caesar’s campaigns. They were clamoring for retirement and money or a plot of land. Demobilizing his legions was enormously expensive, but principally a simple process. It would be much harder to reform the army in such a way that the civil wars of the past century would not happen again. The problem was veteran settlement: the rural and urban poor that had served in Rome’s legions since Marius’ reforms had no income to provide for themselves after their retirement from the army. When the senate refused to solve this problem, they had turned to their generals, who in turn proceeded to use this loyal clientele for their own political goals. The solution was subtle and fitted in tradition: Rome’s soldiers from now on would serve a set number of years. Instead of being liable for sixteen and later 20 years of service in total, as was the norm in the Republican era, legionaries now had to serve that same period consecutively, with another four as ‘reservist’, evocatus. After their service, their imperator, Augustus, was responsible for their pension-fund, thereby binding them to him. About half of Antony’s and his own veterans were immediately discharged, paid for by confiscations and booty from the civil wars. The remaining soldiers were then reorganized in 28 legions, a large number of auxiliary units supplied by allied nations and client-kings, several fleets and a personal bodyguard. Augustus second warrant against civil war was to ensure tight control over the army. Almost all legions were garrisoned within his substantial province to be commanded by a select few, hand-picked men from his own circle of friends and family. For those units that fell under senatorial control, Augustus could exert his influence to ensure an appointment that pleased him. Control over the fleets in Italy and at Forum Iulii was probably granted to equestrians, or sometimes freedmen chosen by the emperor. It is certain that the emperor was the ultimate authority as well where it concerned the displacement of the troops, as is shown by the document that Augustus passed on to his heir. The idea of having standing garrisons in the provinces, however, was not one of Augustus. That too was a subtle adaptation of the Republican system. Although they almost slip under the radar, it is clear from our sources that the provinces of the empire had had legionary garrisons from at least the early 1st century BC. The changes in organization, makeup and character of this army was hardly revolutionary. Where it concerns these aspects, the Augustan era was much more a transitional and experimental phase than a new start.