So far, all I have proposed is based on theory and supposition, yet a study of the sources can be used to support the idea that what has been suggested may not be too far from the truth. The division of the functions of military and civilian officials and of the provinces obviously resulted in a great increase in the numbers involved at the top level, with the forty-five to fifty governors of the earlier empire being replaced by those needed to run over one hundred provinces where there was now a potential need for two top officials.  In theory, in the Early Empire  the emperor could pick and choose for fewer posts, yet there is still evidence for corruption and incompetence.  How more likely is this to be the case when the number of officials needed is anywhere up to four or five times that required in the early empire and the Emperor has to rely on references/patronisation  to fill many of the posts?

Evidence both for and against this can be seen in Ammianus.  For example:

".... Dagalaifus was sent from Paris...[but he]...delayed for a long time under the pretext that it was impossible for him to attack the barbarianshile they were scattered over various places.  Then Jovinus ... was appointed .... and .... suddenly fell upon a great throng of the savages and ... utterly annihilated them. [He then] ... destroyed the second division of the enemy." (Amm. Marc. xxvii, 2.2-8)

 Later, Jovinus discovered a third group and fought a drawn-out, indecisive battle only to find that the enemy slipped away at night.

Emperors could attempt to bypass the incompetence of men such as Dagalaifus, for example when Julian "...put in command of the soldiers men approved by long trial." (Amm. Marc. xxii, 7.7), but the sheer number of posts available must have resulted in the appointment of men unsuited to the task.

The above examples of Dagalaifus and Jovinus illustrates that both good and bad were present in the military staff, and the actions of Julian implies that not only were both Julian and Ammianus aware of the necessity for military commanders to have military experience, but that the previous incumbents were deficient in their knowledge of military matters.

Furthermore, also from Ammianus, the sentence "... under Anatolius, ... prefect of Illyrium, all necessary supplies had been brought together even ahead of time and were still coming in without trouble to anyone" (Amm. Marc. xix, 11.2) is evidence that, under competent leadership, the provisioning of military forces was a relatively simple matter. However, the passage can be used as evidence that Anatolius' efficiency in the gathering of supplies for the troops was exceptional.

I do not intend to pursue the subject of incompetence and corruption in depth here, except to state that it is likely that in the scramble for power amongst such a large number of officials, the intrigue and deception that may have previously gone on when individuals were out of office now seems to continue whilst they are in office, possibly to the detriment of the empire.

An example of such intrigue can be seen in Ammianus: "A certain Dynamius....had asked Silvanus for letters of recommendation to his friends..... he kept the letters, intending to work some mischief at the proper time... and had as his abettors Lampadius, the praetorian prefect, Eusebius, former keeper of the privy purse,.....Aedisius, late master of the rolls, all of whom the said prefect had arranged to have called to the consulship as his nearest friends. With a sponge he effaced the contents of the letters, leaving only the signature intact...." (Amm. Marc. xv, 5.3-5).  This example illustrates both the complexity of these machinations as well as the high rank of those involved. Anyone interested in the topic of corruption should see MacMullen, although to my mind he paints far too black a picture.

There is also evidence to show that even where an official is competent and willing to do his duty, he could actually be hindered in this by the military reforms leaving him with too few troops for the job. An example of this can be seen, again, in Ammianus; "Charietto, who was then commanding general throughout both Germanies, (per utramque Germaniam comes) ..... set out to meet their [Alamanni] first divisions, taking as a partner in the campaign Severianus, who was also a general,......who at Cabillona [Chalon-sur-Saone] commanded the Divitenses and Tungrican."' (Amm. Marc. xxvii, 1.2-3).  It is clear that Charietto believed that the combined force of 'both Germanies' was not sufficient for the task in hand and he therefore needed more troops.  Incidentally, Charietto was right in his assumption, as even with the Severianus' forces the Romans were defeated and Charietto was killed.

What is noteworthy about the wording of the passage is the phrase "....taking as a partner".  This can be taken to indicate that the 'Count of both Germanies' may not have the right to give orders to a tribune of legionaries in command of two garrison units. Although possibly a method by which Ammianus gave credit to Severianus for his willingness to fight, the episode emphasises the fragmentation of the Roman system and raises questions about the Roman hierarchy which will be discussed later.