Strategy and Tactics

One of the main features of the epitoma is Vegetius' advice on strategy and tactics.  Due to problems of space, only those bearing most on topics concerning general tactics - with special relation to the period in which he was writing - will be covered.  It was noted above that many of his maxims on warfare have been dismissed as trivial and self-evident, and this has already been questioned.[40]  What is undeniable is the relevance of his advice concerning 'guerrilla' warfare.[41] 

When covering the period after the arrival of the Tervingi in the empire and their subsequent revolt, Ammianus furnishes evidence which suggests that the most effective counter to the presence of enemy forces is by harassment rather than a straightforward battle - a concept which is reinforced in hindsight by the defeat and death of the emperor Valens at Adrianople.[42]  As a consequence, it is possible to see Vegetius' proposals as a continuation of Ammianus' narrative and note that the advice was followed with success throughout the remainder of the Western Empire: whenever there was a problem with barbarian infiltration, the first attempts to nullify it seem to have been by 'scorched earth' tactics.[43]

The emphasis placed by Vegetius on guerrilla warfare can be coupled with the obvious advice on how not to be caught off-guard oneself.  Yet the repeated idea that the Roman forces were expected to be outnumbered, whilst possibly to some degree a literary topoi, appears to have been the case in reality.[44]

Yet whilst looking at the piece's relevance to its period, these factors, whilst obvious, are often overlooked for just that reason.  In many cases, such as Julian's campaigns in Gaul, the number of Germanic warriors causing problems with their raids appear to have been comparatively small, and in these cases, as in Ammianus, Vegetius gives the most effective response as being the ambush of the invaders rather than any attempt to instigate a formal battle.[45]  However the factor of the small size of these forces could disguise the fact that they could coalesce to form a large army, as happened before Adrianople. 

Therefore, the advice in Vegetius may have more than one purpose.  The ambush of the enemy could give victory at less cost to oneself, it would bolster the morale of your own troops if they are repeatedly victorious in even small campaigns, and the ambush could be utilised as a method of keeping the enemy forces dispersed whilst they are dealt with piecemeal.  Furthermore, the advice can serve as a reminder that after Adrianople the Romans would be less inclined to risk a formal battle.  The strategy appears to have been exactly that propounded later by Vegetius of engaging the enemy in small, easily won combats in which the morale of the army was restored.  Consequently, the relevance of the text to the period after Adrianople cannot be too highly stressed.  The work offers a clear insight into the minds of the Roman aristocracy after the disaster and gives a clear, and surprisingly sharp, series of instructions on how to reverse both the loss of the morale of the army, and to begin to win back lost ground.

Also within the context of Adrianople, the chapter concerned with the precautions to be used in battle give examples, such as dust-storms, that actually occurred during the course of the conflict.  Therefore, the advice is not only relevant but can be taken as a strong indictment of both Valens' and his military advisors' conduct  on the day of the battle.[46]