Training

As was just stated, 'Vegetius chief criticism....of the Roman army of his day continually revolves around.... the inferiority of recruits and the lack of training which they are given.'[35]  That Vegetius states this is without doubt and there is nowhere within the work that this complaint does not loom large, with the consequence that the later army has often been seen as inferior in training, and hence quality, to the legions of the later Republic and early Empire.  Vegetius' validity notwithstanding, historians have recently begun to question the accuracy of the concept, with the result that Vegetius' comments on lack of training are now being held up to question. 

A leading proponent of the new school is Ferrill, who doubts Vegetius for the reason that '.....even defeated Roman armies inflicted heavy losses as their discipline meant that they did not quickly run away.'[36]  The observation is a valid one, and the result is that there appear to be irreconcilable differences between historians such as Ferrill, and Vegetius.  On the other hand, a solution has already been offered to the quandary.  This is the proposal that Vegetius was only familiar with the guard units stationed permanently around the emperor. 

From the time of Constantine it appears that the greater number of guard units were either the 'elite' of the army or were raised from non-Roman peoples, usually of Germanic origin.  Even from the early period of the empire there were complaints about the efficiency of the Praetorian Guard.  By the time of Vegetius Romans serving in the guard unitswere probably not career soldiers but men who had purchased their 'commissions'. They are unlikely to have accepted the rigours of vigourous training.   Furthermore, as barbarian units may have been expected to fight in their traditional manner,  with little need for training, the notion that these elite units were severely lacking in discipline and training is hardly surprising.  Therefore the claim that Roman '....defeats were due to failure in leadership, not training, discipline or morale as at Adrianople the army stood and fought' can be explained and accepted.[37] 

As a final validation of the point, the passage in Ammianus describing the battle of Adrianople carries some weight;[38]

'While all scattered in flight over unknown paths, the emperor, hedged about by dire terrors, and slowly treading over heaps of corpses, took refuge with the lancers and the Mattiari, who, so long as the vast numbers of the enemy could be sustained, had stood unshaken with bodies firmly planted  On seeing him Trajanus cried that all hope was gone, unless the emperor, abandoned by his bodyguard, should at least be protected by his foreign auxiliaries.  On hearing this the general called Victor hastened to bring quickly to the emperor's aid the Batavi, who had been posted not far off as a reserve force; but when he could find none of them he retired and went away.  An d in the same way Richomeres and Saturninus made their escape from danger.'

On the other hand, the rehabilitation of the later army is not yet complete.  Even one of its chief proponents still subconsciously discounts them as a fighting force.  For example, Ferrill states that between 406 and 410 Roman infantry could not stand up to the barbarian forces, which is a clear contradiction of the preceding sentence where the problem is not one of standing up to the enemy, but of not having the discipline to pursue the enemy.[39] 

Having now investigated the subject, it appears that Vegetius' complaints on the need to train the army may not be referring to the whole army, but only to those around the emperor, with the ensuing conclusion that in this, his main criticism, Vegetius may be in error.