Conclusion

We now have to arrive at an answer to the question of whether the reforms suggested by Vegetius were applicable, and of whether the work is relevant in the era in which it was composed. 

In answer to the first question, the main obstacle that the reforms would have had to overcome would have been the conditioning of the citizen body to the contemporary system.  Dismissal of modern assumptions concerning lack of recruits results in the theory that adequate manpower for the project would have been available, yet there may still have been a problem thanks, as Vegetius himself observes, to the fact that citizens now preferred to serve in either a civilian capacity, or at worst, the auxilia.  Here we can perceive one of Vegetius' main faults: his blindness to the fact that attitudes had changed since the early empire.  The outcome of any attempted reform may have resulted in a real lack of recruits and an active avoidance throughout the empire of military service. 

Although it is nowhere implicitly stated in the work, Vegetius appears to have been aware of the far fewer number of legions in the earlier periods.  His acknowledgement of the fact may be alluded to at III.1, where he allots various numbers of troops for campaigns of different severity. 

It is possible that he assumes that there would be little need for new recruits, since the large number of men needed to form the older, larger legions could be raised simply by reassigning citizens already serving in existing units, including the auxilia.  On the other hand, Valentinian III attempted to expand the army and failed due to lack of capital.  This neither hints at problems with recruits nor does it necessarily mean that Theodosius would have suffered the same cash-flow problem with the resources of the whole empire behind him.  As a result of these observations, I believe that the restoration of the antiqua legio was, in isolation, feasible.

Yet the fact that these aspects of reform were possible should not blind us to the realisation that the reformation of the legion, whilst in itself a simple thing, would have resulted in unimaginable problems when it came to reorganising the logistics and other apparatus that was currently in existence for the running of a completely different army.  The reforms usually credited to Diocletian must be seen, not in the light of a single, momentous event, but as the culmination of a long series of minor reforms which gradually transformed the whole army to a point where what Diocletian did was mainly to finalise the details of a continuous evolution that had been in progress for over a century.  When seen from this perspective, it is soon realised that although in principle the reforms proposed by Vegetius would have been feasible, any attempt to change the whole structure of the military machine in one bound would have resulted in grave disruptions which are likely to have left the empire completely at the mercy of its enemies.[54]

As a final point on the matter of reform, we must turn to the reign of Justinian and his successors.  Justinian’s policies can be seen as the beginning of a reversal of the policies of Diocletian and Constantine.  The uniting the civilian and military roles in one post – reminiscent of the earlier provincial governors - can be taken as a realisation that in some respects the older system was preferable, and may be seen as a vindication of Vegetius' ideas.  Yet the fact that neither Justinian nor any of his successors reverted to the old legionary-based army may also be a recognition that the time for the legions had passed and that there was no return. 

That the piece is relevant to the period of its writing can be seen without doubt.  Although in several areas Vegetius may be mistaken, such as the suggested request to Gratian that army be allowed to discard their armour, I find that the further one delves into the work the more questions it raises on the assumptions that have been made by modern historians.  One example of this is the assumed difficulty of recruiting, which is nowhere mentioned in the text.  The work also raises questions about theories on the ethnic composition of the army and its officers, as there are no allusions to Germanic leaders anywhere within the text which, along with the other matters already mentioned.  This leads me to believe that where Vegetius and modern authorities disagree with each other about contemporary values and events, it is Vegetius that is likely to be the more correct and relevant on most counts.

                                                                                        Ian Hughes