If Vegetius is mistaken, it may be the result of his not being associated with the army in an official capacity and so having contact only with those units in permanent attendance upon the emperor.  Furthermore, Vegetius is criticizing the inability of the legions to construct marching-camps.   The auxilia had never been expected to do so.  In theory, non-citizens could not serve in the legions, so the loss of this ability by the legions cannot be assigned to the use of ‘barbarians’.  As a consequence, Milner's theory that the phenomenon is an illustration of barbarian recruits affecting the efficiency of the Roman legions is no longer tenable.[16]

The fact that he was not in close contact with the field forces may also be behind Vegetius' impression that the troops were allowed by Gratian to stop wearing armour and helmets, a claim dismissed by Gordon as 'sheer nonsense'.[17].  A possible interpretation is that Vegetius is basing his views on the (hypothesised) petitioning by the guard units that they be allowed to stop wearing armour when on ceremonial duty in the presence of the emperor.  Such a reinterpretation does cause a problem, since Vegetius' following comment relates that the lack of armour was the reason behind the losses to the Goths, with the unprotected infantry simply being mown down by Gothic archers.  But on the other hand this also can be explained: given that Vegetius was a patriotic Roman, the lack of armour would be a sensible reason behind the long-running problems with the Goths, as it would in some way explain both the dramatic loss at Adrianople and the ensuing military problems associated with the defeat.  The alternative would be to admit possible Roman inferiority.  Consequently, it may be seen as a convenient excuse for current problems, in which case it is possible that Vegetius' statement that the army was allowed by Gratian to discard their armour may not be wholly accurate: it actually refers to only a small proportion of the Roman forces, and then only when on parade duty.

A continuing reassessment of the work can also lead to a change in the  interpretation of Vegetius' statement that the earlier legion did not need auxilia.  A straightforward reading of the chapter in question reinforces just that impression, but there is a difficulty with this interpretation.  Although Vegetius states categorically that the auxilia should not be required, as the ancient army had its own integral light troops, earlier in the same chapter he states that they were both useful and omnipresent.  The apparent contradiction can, however, be solved if we see Vegetius as referring to a situation akin to Arrian's Ektaxis Kontra Alanoi, in which the auxilia play a secondary role to the legions by supporting them on the wings and being ready to pursue whilst the legions bear the brunt of the fighting.  This interpretation may be seen as being reinforced by the statement that the Romans conquered the world thanks to their legions, coupled with the idea that the 'auxilia were always joined to the (old) legions in battle as light troops.'  Whichever way that the chapter is viewed, that Vegetius saw the need for an 'integrated' army reflects highly upon the clarity of his vision and, as Ferrill remarked, in this respect he rises far above his modern military critics.[18]

As a consequence of the above discussion, the theory expressed by Milner that Vegetius is a criticism of the barbarianisation of the auxilia can now be seen as mistaken.  The work is actually an attack on the incorrect use of the auxilia as elite reserves and a censure on their greatly exaggerated social rating in that they now rank higher than the legions.